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Abstract. The stable roommates problem with n agents has worst case complexity O(n2)
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1. Introduction
Matching under preferences is a topic of great practical importance, deep mathematical
structure, and elegant algorithmics [1, 2]. The most famous example is the stable marriage
problem, where n men and n women compete with each other in the “marriage market.” Each
man ranks all the women according to his individual preferences, and each woman does the
same with all men. Everybody wants to get married to someone at the top of his or her list,
but mutual attraction is not symmetric and frustration and compromises are unavoidable. A
minimum requirement is a matching of men and women such that no man and woman would
agree to leave their assigned partners in order to marry each other. Such a matching is called
stable since no individual has an icentive to break it. The problem then is to find such a stable
matching.
The stable marriage problem was introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962
[3]. In their seminal paper they proved that each instance of the marriage problem has at least
one stable solution, and they presented an efficient algorithm to find it. Since then, the Gale-
Shapley algorithm has been applied to many real-world problems, not by dating agencies but
by central bodies that organize two-sided markets like the assignment of students to colleges
or residents to hospitals [4]. Besides its practical relevance, the stable marriage problem
has many interesting theoretical features that have attracted researchers from various field,
including physics [5–9].
The salient feature of the stable marriage problem is its bipartite structure: the agents
form two groups (men and women), and matchings are only allowed between these groups
but not within a group. This is adequate for two-sided markets. But what about one-sided
markets, like the formation of cockpit crews from a pool of pilots or the assignment of students
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to the double bedrooms in a dormitory? The latter is known as the stable roommates problem.
It is the paradigmatic example for matchings in one-sided markets.
The stable roommates problem was also introduced by Gale and Shapley [3]. They
noted an intriguing difference between the marriage and the roommates problem: Whereas
the former always has a solution, the latter may have none.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for bipartite matching does not work for non-bipartite
problems like the stable roommates problem. In fact some people believed that the roommates
problem was NP-complete [10], but more than 20 years after the Gale-Shapley paper, Robert
Irving presented a polynomial time algorithm for the stable roommates problem [11]. Irving’s
algorithm either yields a stable solution or “No” if none exists.
An instance of the stable roommates problem consists of an even number n of persons
(students, pilots), each of whom ranks all of the others in strict order of preference. Since each
person has to keep a list of preferences for all n− 1 other persons, an instance of the stable
roommates problem has size Θ(n2). Irving’s algorithm has time complexity O(n2). This is
optimal if we assume that one has to look at the complete instance (or at least a finite fraction
of it) in order to solve the problem.
In this paper we show that in random instances, Irving’s algorithm only looks at O(
√
n)
entries in each preference list, and we provide a modification of the algorithm that has average
time and space complexity O(n
3
2 ). We use this algorithm to compute the probability pn that a
random instance of size n has a solution for systems that are more than 500 times larger than
previously simulated systems [12].
The paper is organized as follows. We start with a review of Irving’s algorithm. In
Section 3 we discuss the complexity of Irving’s algorithm for random instances and our
modification that reduces the average time and space complexity from O(n2) to O(n
3
2 ).
Section 4 comprises the results of the simulations on pn, obtained with the modified algorithm.
2. The Algorithm
Irving’s algorithm can be expressed as a sequence of “proposals” from one person to another.
If person x makes a proposal to person y (to share a room, to form a cockpit crew etc.), y can
accept or reject this proposal. If y accepts the proposal, x becomes semiengaged to y. If y later
receives another proposal from someone he prefers to x, he will accept the new proposal and
cancel the semiengagement from x, who will in turn look for someone else to propose to.
As the name suggests, semiengagement is not symmetric: if x is semiengaged to y, y can
be semiangaged to z 6= x or to no one. If all semiengagements are symmetric, they represent a
matching.
Irving’s algorithm proceeds in two phases. Phase I sets up semiengagements for
everybody. In phase II, these semiengagements are modified by cyclically swapping
partners until all semiengagements are symmetric, i.e., until they represent a matching. The
corresponding sequence of proposals (and breakups) is organized such that the resulting
matching is stable. If the instance admits no stable matching, this is recognized either in
phase I or phase II by running out of partners to propose to.
For the time being, we assume that the preferences of all participants are stored in two
2-dimensional arrays:
• person[x,i]: person on position i in x’s list,
• rank[x,y]: position of person y in x’s list.
The two arrays are not independent, of course, but the redundancy allows us to look up persons
and ranks in time O(1).
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For random instances we initialize the preference list of person x a by random
permutation of all other persons (including x) and then move x to the very end of its own
preference list. This means that we allow x being matched with himself as the worst choice. If
this really happens, this means that x has no proper partner, i.e. that no stable matching exists
for that instance.
In our implementation of the algorithm we will access the preference lists only through
the function
function GETDATA(x, i)
y := person[x, i]
r := rank[y, x]
return (y, r)
end function
which returns the pair (y,r) where y is the person with rank i in x’s prefence list and r is rank
of person x in y’s preference list.
We will describe both phases of Irving’s algorithm without proving their correctness. For
the proofs we refer the reader to Irving’s original paper [11].
2.1. Phase I
Phase I of the algorithm tries to establish semiengagements for every person. The general
idea is that the first proposal of x goes to the first person on his preference list, and only if
this proposal is rejected (immediately or subsequently), x proposes to the second person on
his preference list and so on. On the receiving side, y accepts a proposal only if the proposing
person ranks higher on his preference list than the person whose proposal he has currently
accepted.
Imagine the list of preferences written horizontally left (most desired partner) to right
(least desired partner). Then the proposals made move from left to right, while the proposals
accepted move from right to left. In a matching, both types of proposals meet at the same
position. This motivates the names for the following lists that hold the current set of proposals:
• leftperson[x]: the person whom x is currently proposing to,
• leftrank[x]: the rank of that person in x’s preference list,
• rightperson[x]: the person from which x is currently holding a proposal
• rightrank[x]: the rank of that person in x’s preference list.
Again these lists are not independent, but the redundancy allows a faster lookup especially in
phase II.
With this lists, the semiengagement of x to y is expressed by the simultaneous validity of
the identities y= leftperson[x] and x= rightperson[y].
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for phase I of Irving’s algorithm. It stops, when every
person holds a proposal, which implies that every person has also made a proposal that has
been accepted, i.e. that every person is semiengaged. It returns false if someone has run out of
partners (and is therefore engaged to himself), which means that there is no stable matching
for this instance. If it returns true, we can still hope to find a stable matching in phase II of
the algorithm.
2.2. Phase II
Phase I usually ends with everybody semiengaged to someone, but with asymmetric
engagements leftrank[x]< rightrank[x] for most persons x. Such persons have to give up their
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Algorithm 1 Phase I of the stable roommates algorithm
1: procedure PHASE I
2: for x := 1, . . . ,n do . initialization
3: holds proposal[x] := false . no one is holding a proper proposal...
4: rightperson[x] := x . ...but a proposal from self
5: rightrank[x] := n . self proposals are the worst
6: leftrank[x] := 1
7: end for
8: for x := 1 . . .n do
9: proposer := x
10: repeat
11: (next, rank) := GETDATA(proposer, leftrank[proposer])
12: while rank > rightrank[next] do
13: leftrank[proposer] := leftrank[proposer]+1
14: (next, rank) := GETDATA(proposer, leftrank[proposer])
15: end while
16: previous := rightperson[next]
17: rightrank[next] := rank
18: rightperson[next] := proposer
19: leftperson[proposer] = next
20: proposer := previous
21: until holds proposal[next] = false
22: holds proposal[next] := true
23: if leftrank[proposer] = n then . proposer engaged to himself...
24: return false . ... means: no stable matching possible
25: end if
26: end for
27: return true
28: end procedure
current proposal to leftperson[x] and find somebody down the list that would (temporarily)
accept a proposal from x. We keep track of these second choices in the following lists
• secondperson[x]: x’s next best person that would accept a proposal
• secondrank[x]: the rank of that person in x’s preference list,
• secondrightrank[x]: the rank of x in the preference list of secondperson[x].
If x withdraws his proposal and proposes to y = secondperson[x], who temporarily accepts
the proposal, the previous partners of x and y both loose their semiengagements and have to
look themselves for their second best partners and so on. This avalanche of break-ups and
new propsals is called a rotation. It reduces the difference rightrank[x]-leftrank[x] for several
persons x and is a step towards a matching.
The key idea of phase II is to organize this rearrangement of semiengagements in a so
called all-or-nothing cycle. This is a sequence a1 . . . ,ar of persons such that ai’s current
second choice is ai+1’s current first choice for i= 1 . . . ,r−1, and ar’s current second choice
is a1’s current first choice. In terms of our lists, an all-or-nothing cycle is given by
secondperson[ai] = leftperson[ai+1] i= 1, . . . ,r−1
secondperson[ar] = leftperson[a1] .
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In phase II of Irving’s algorithm, an all-or-nothing cycle is identified and the corresponding
rotation is executed. This process is iterated until there are no more all-or-nothing cycles
(in which case we’ve found a stable matching) or until someone runs out of partners after a
rotation (in which case this instance has no stable matching).
Algorithm 2 Finding an all-or-nothing cycle for phase II of the stable roommates algorithm
1: procedure SEEKCYCLE( )
2: for x := 1, . . . ,n do
3: if leftrank[x]< rightrank[x] then break . find unmatched person
4: end for
5: if leftrank[x]≥ rightrank[x] then . no unmatched person found
6: return (0,0, /0) . return empty cycle
7: else . unmatched person found
8: last := 1
9: repeat
10: cycle[last] := x
11: last := last + 1
12: p := leftrank[x]
13: repeat . find second choice of x
14: p := p+1
15: (y,r) := GETDATA(x, p)
16: until r ≤ rightrank[y] . y would accept a proposal
17: secondrank[x] := p . store second choice
18: secondperson[x] := y
19: secondrightrank[x] := r
20: x := rightperson[secondperson[x]] . next element in cycle
21: until x ∈ cycle . cycle closed
22: last := last−1
23: first := last−1 . rewind to start of cycle
24: while cycle[first] 6= x do first := first−1
25: return (first, last, cycle)
26: end if
27: end procedure
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for a function that finds and returns an all-or-nothing
cycle or an empty cycle. To compute a cycle we need to identify the person whose current
first choice is y = secondperson[x]. But this person is simply given by rightperson[y], i.e., it
can be found in time O(1) (see line 20 of Alg. 2).
Algorithm 3 shows pseudocode for phase II which finds an all-or-nothing cycle, executes
the corresponding rotation and iterates this until there are no more all-or-nothing cycles or a
rotation has left a person without any partners to propose to.
The complete algorithm consists of an initialization phase (not shown), which generates
a random preference list for each person, followed by calls to PHASE I and PHASE II.
3. Analysis and Modification
Figure 1 shows the average running times of the different phases on random instances of
varying size n. The only phase that scales like Θ(n2) is the initialization, i.e., the generation
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Algorithm 3 Phase II of the stable roommates algorithm
1: procedure PHASE II
2: solution possible := true
3: solution found := false
4: while solution possible and not solution found do
5: (first, last, cycle) := SEEKCYCLE( )
6: if cycle is empty then solution found := true
7: else
8: for x := cycle[first], . . . ,cycle[last] do
9: leftrank[x] := secondrank[x]
10: leftperson[x] := secondperson[x]
11: rightrank[leftperson[x]] := secondrightrank[x]
12: rightperson[leftperson[x]] = x
13: end for
14: for x := cycle[first], . . . ,cycle[last] do
15: if leftrank[x]> rightrank[x] then sol possible := false
16: end for
17: end if
18: end while
19: return solution found
20: end procedure
of the random permutation of the preference lists. The time for the actual solution (phase
I and phase II) grows significantly slower than n2, which implies that the algorithm doesn’t
need to look at the complete preference table to solve the problem.
Figure 2 shows the average number of entries in the preference lists that are actually read
by Irving’s algorithm in order to find a stable matching or to report that no stable matching
exists. For large values of n, this number is 2n
3
2 . This can be understood by the following
simple, albeit non rigorous consideration. Let k be the average number of proposals that
a person makes in the course of Irving’s algorithm. Then k is also the average number
of proposals that a person receives, and the total number of entries in the preference table
involved is 2kn. Now leftrank[x] increases by one with each proposal made by x, hence
leftrank[x] = k on average. The value of rightrank[x] is given by the minimum of k values
drawn uniformly from 1, . . . ,n. Hence the distribution of rightrank[x] = ` is
P(`) =
(n−`
k−1
)(n
k
) ,
with mean value n+1k+1 . The algorithm terminates if leftrank[x]' rightrank[x] or k' n+1k+1 . Hence
k ' √n, and the total number of entries read by Irving’s algorithm is 2n 32 . Note that this
consideration ignores the fluctuations in rightrank[x]: if k ' √n, the standard deviation of
P(`) is O(
√
n), hence the number of proposals received by an individual person x can differ
considerably from the mean value
√
n. We do have the strict equality between the total number
of proposals made and total number of proposals received, however. But a person, who has
received more proposals than average, at termination has made less proposals than the average
(and vice versa). Hence the individual fluctuations cancel in the total number of proposals if
we assume, that at termination leftrank[x] ' rightrank[x] for almost all persons x. This is not
obvious, since in most cases (see next section) the algorithm terminates when the first person
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Figure 1. Running times of the various phases of Irving’s algorithm for random instances
of the stable roommates problem. The total running time is dominated by the time for
initialization of the complete instance. This time scales like n2, whereas the time for the
actual solution (phases I and II) grows much slower. The time T is the average wallclock time
in seconds on a single core of an Intel Xeon E5-1620 CPU running at 3.6 GHz. The “bump”
in the data for phase I is probably due to cache misses for larger systems.
runs out of partners to propose to, i.e. the first time that leftrank[x] > rightrank[x] for some
x. It could well be that at that moment the gap between leftrank and rightrank is still large
for some or many other persons. Hence the crucial assumption that underlies our argument
is the assumption of a certain uniformity of the decrease of rightrank[x]− leftrank[x] over all
persons x. The fact that the observed total number of proposal is in fact narrowly concentrated
around the predicted value (Figure 2) is an indication that this assumption is justified.
The number of elements read in phase I is even smaller. Phase I terminates if every person
holds a proposal. Consider the sequence x1,x2, . . . of persons that receive a proposal. Phase
I terminates if this sequence contains every person at least once. If we assume that the xi’s
are independent random variables, uniformly drawn from {1, . . . ,n}, this problem is known
as the coupon collector’s problem [10]: an urn contains n different coupons, and a collector
draws coupons from that urn with replacement. How many coupons does the collector need
to draw (on average), before he has drawn each coupon at least once? It is well known that
the collector should expect to draw
n
(
1+
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+ 1
n
)
= nHn
coupons in order to own at least one coupon of every kind. Hn is known as the nth harmonic
number. Note that
nHn = n logn+ γn+
1
2
+O(n−1) , (1)
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Figure 2. Number of elements in the preference tables that are actually read by Irving’s
algorithm. Each symbol represents an average over 104 random instances. The lines are 2n
3
2
for the total number of elements and 2nHn for phase I, where Hn is the nth harmonic number.
where γ = 0.5772156 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
In our case, the n coupons are the proposals to the n different recipients, and phase I is
the coupon collector. Hence the expected number of proposals in phase I is nHn, and since
each proposal implies two accesses to the preference lists, the number of elements read in
phase I should be 2nHn. This is in fact the observed asymptotic scaling, as can be seen in
Figure 2.
We can exploit the fact that Irving’s algorithm looks only at O(n3/2) elements of
preference table by generating and storing only the elements that are requested by the
algorithm. This saves us the expensive initialization phase and reduces the memory
consumption considerably. Algorithm 4 shows the corresponding version of the function
GETDATA. It maintains two arrays (person and rank) of maps. A map (aka associative array)
is a data structure that holds pairs (k,v) where k is the key and v is the value of the data
element. In the map person[x], the key is the rank and the value is the person of that rank
in x’s preference list. The map rank[x] holds the same data elements but with the role of
key and value reversed. The rationale behind this redundancy is again efficiency: using hash
tables, a map can be implemented such that the lookup of a value given the key can be done
in (expected) constant time, independent of the number of elements. Hence GETDATA has
average time complexity O(1) when the requested data element is already known. When the
requested element is new, the generation of a new random element may take longer since we
need to generate a random person y that is not contained in x’s preference list so far and an
unoccupied rank r for person x in y’s list. Both are computed by a simple loop that generates
random numbers until it hits a number not already contained in the list. In our case this
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Algorithm 4 This version of the GetData function generates the entries of the preference
lists “on the fly” as they are requested. The preference list of person x is maintained in the
associative arrays person[x] and rank[x].
1: function GETDATA(x, i)
2: if i ∈ rank[x] then . element is known
3: y := person[x](i)
4: r := rank[y](x)
5: else . element is new
6: repeat
7: y := random . generate random person
8: until y 6∈ person[x]
9: repeat
10: r := random . generate random rank
11: until r 6∈ rank[y]
12: person[x] := person[x]∪ (y, i) . save new table entries
13: rank[x] := rank[x]∪ (i,y)
14: person[y] := person[y]∪ (x,r)
15: rank[y] := rank[y]∪ (r,x)
16: end if
17: return (y,r)
18: end function
is a reasonable approach since we know that the expected number of elements in person[x]
and rank[y] is O(
√
n), hence the expected number of iterations in our loop is 1+O(n−1/2).
Since inserting new elements in a map can also be done in constant time, the average time
complexity of GETDATA is O(1). Each map is initialized with the single entry person[x][n]=x
and rank[x][x]=n, all other entries are only added as needed.
The function GETDATA is called unconditionally from within the innermost loop in
phase I. In phase II it is called for each element in search for a cycle (including all cycle
elements). Hence the number of calls of GETDATA is a good measure for the average time
complexity of the algorithm. As can be seen in Figure 3, the average time complexity is
indeed Θ(n
3
2 ).
The actual memory usage depends on the implementation of the map. We used
the container class unordered map from the C++ standard library provided by the GNU
Compiler Collection (http://gcc.gnu.org). Figure 4 shows the total memory usage of
the program. For large values of n it is dominated by the maps person and rank and scales
like n3/2. On a computer with 64 GBytes of memory our implementation allows us to run
problems up to n ' 470000, which is more than 5 times larger than the maximum problem
size allowed by a straightforward implementation with storage of the complete preference
tables. The memory efficiency of our implementation is in fact so good that time becomes the
bottleneck, as we will see in the next section.
4. Application
A long standing open problem is the computation of the probability pn that a random instance
of the stable roommates problem of size n has a stable matching [2, problem 8]. In particular
one is interested in the asymptotic behavior of pn as n grows large.
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Figure 3. Number of calls of function GETDATA. Each symbol represents an average over
104 random instances. The line is n
3
2 .
There is an integral representation for pn that can be used to compute pn exactly [13].
Unfortunately, the number of terms in the integral increases exponentially with n2, which had
limited the explicit evaluation of pn to the case n = 4. Using a computer algebra system, we
evaluated the integrals for n≤ 10 [14]:
p4 =
26
27
= 0.96296 . . .
p6 =
181431847
194400000
= 0.93329 . . .
p8 =
809419574956627
889426440000000
= 0.910046 . . .
p10 =
25365465754520943457921774207
28460490127321448448000000000
= 0.891251 . . . .
Computing pn for larger values of n requires Monte Carlo simulations. These simulations
indicate that pn is a monotonically decreasing function of n, but early simulations up to
n= 2000 [15] did not settle the question as to whether pn converges to 0 or to some positive
constant. The problem with simulations is that the decay of pn is rather slow. In fact Pittel [13]
proved the asymptotic lower bound
pn &
2e3/2√
pin
(2)
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Figure 4. Actual memory consumption of Irving’s algorithm for random instances,
implemented with associative maps. The solid line is a numerical Θ(n3/2) fit, the dashed
line marks the 64 GBytes limit of our hardware.
by applying the second moment method to the number of stable matchings. Extended
simulations [12] up to n = 20000 suggested an algebraic decay pn ' an−δ . The numerical
data from [12] was used to boldly conjecture the values of a and δ as
pn ' e
√
2
pi
n−1/4 . (3)
Using our algorithm with reduced running time and memory consumption, we can check this
conjecture against extended numerical data.
We simulated systems of size n = n02k, k = 0, . . . ,kmax and n0 ∈ {8,10,12,14} where
kmax is limited by the available memory. In our case this means kmax ≤ 15 (Figure 4). The
corresponding instances have an effective size that is more than 500 times larger than the
largest systems investigated in [12].
To measure pn, we generate and solve M independent random instances of size n and
record the fraction pˆn of samples that admit a stable matching. The 95% confidence interval
for pn is then pˆn±2σn, where the standard deviation σ is given by
σn =
√
pˆn(1− pˆn)
M
. (4)
We vary the number of samples M with the system size n. We used values from M = 1010 for
small values of n down to M = 104 for the largest values of n. Table 1 shows the results.
We ran our simulation on a small cluster consisting of five nodes. Each node has 64
GByte of RAM and two Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630 running at 2.30GHz. Each CPU has
6 real cores or (using hpyerthreading) 12 virtual cores. For smaller systems, we can use
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n pn n pn n pn n pn
8 0.910048(5) 128 0.60986(1) 2048 0.32473(9) 32768 0.1650(4)
10 0.891247(6) 160 0.58183(1) 2560 0.30794(9) 40960 0.1563(4)
12 0.875525(6) 192 0.55946(1) 3072 0.29464(9) 49152 0.1494(3)
14 0.861952(6) 224 0.54099(1) 3584 0.28391(9) 57344 0.1440(5)
16 0.849958(7) 256 0.52536(1) 4096 0.27486(9) 65536 0.140(2)
20 0.829239(7) 320 0.49993(1) 5120 0.26042(9) 81920 0.132(2)
24 0.811499(7) 384 0.47987(1) 6144 0.2492(2) 98304 0.126(2)
28 0.795768(7) 448 0.46339(2) 7168 0.2402(2) 114688 0.120(2)
32 0.781542(8) 512 0.44949(2) 8192 0.2320(2) 131072 0.118(2)
40 0.756482(8) 640 0.42704(2) 10240 0.2200(2) 163840 0.111 (2)
48 0.734851(8) 768 0.40939(7) 12288 0.2103(2) 196608 0.103(6)
56 0.715866(8) 896 0.39482(7) 14336 0.2024(3) 229376 0.104(6)
64 0.699044(9) 1024 0.38270(9) 16384 0.1961(3) 262144 0.098(6)
80 0.670377(9) 1280 0.36327(9) 20480 0.1854(4) 327680 0.097(6)
96 0.646797(9) 1536 0.34782(9) 24576 0.1774(4) 393216 0.089(6)
112 0.62692(1) 1792 0.33526(9) 28672 0.1709(4) 458752 0.085(5)
Table 1. Values of pn from simulations. Notation: p8 = 0.910048(5) means that [0.910048−
0.000005,0.910048+0.000005] is the 95% confidence interval for p8.
all 5× 2× 12 = 120 virtual cores to solve instances in parallel, but for the larger sizes, the
available memory per core limits the number of usable cores. The available memory allows
us to compute problems up to n= 215×14= 458752 using only one core per node. Solving a
single instance of this size takes about 14 minutes, i.e. solving a sample of M = 104 instances
as in Table 1 takes about 20 days on 5 nodes in parallel.
Figure 5 shows pn versus n in a log-log-plot. The data supports an asymptotic algebraic
decay pn ' an−δ for some constants δ and a, in agreement with the conjecture (3), which is
also displayed in Figure 5. The visual impression suggests that δ = 1/4 as claimed in (3),
but that the true prefactor a is slightly larger than e
√
2/pi . In fact, a least squares fit of the
one-parameter function an−1/4 to the data points for n≥ 32765 yields a= 2.223(3), which is
3% larger than e
√
2/pi = 2.1688 . . ..
The numerical value of the fit parameter varies with the choice of the data points used in
the least square fit, however. As a more systematic way to estimate the asymptotic behavior
we applied least squares fitting of the two-parameter function an−δ to sliding windows of
w consecutive data points pn. Figure 6 shows the results for w = 10. Larger values of w
yield similar curves with smaller errorbars but fewer data points. This analysis shows that the
available numerical data for pn supports the conjecture (3) within the errorbars.
A more elementary question is whether limn→∞ pn is zero or non-zero. To address
this question we applied the sliding window technique to fit the three parameter function
pn = an−δ +b. The result for b is a curve very similar to the curves shown in Figure 6 with b
converging to zero within the errorbars. This result supports the claim limn→∞ pn = 0.
5. Conclusions and Outlook
We have demonstrated that Irving’s algorithm for the stable roommates problem can be
organized such that the expected time and space complexity is O(n3/2) on random instances.
Our reasoning about the dynamics of the algorithm (approaching random walks of leftrank and
rightrank, phase I as coupon collector’s problem) is of course non-rigorous, but the results
are well confirmed by the numerical simulations. Maybe this simplistic view on Irving’s
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Figure 5. Simulation results for pn in a log-log-plot. Error bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. The line represents the conjectured asymptotic behavior (3).
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Figure 6. Results of a least-squares fit of pn = an−δ to a sliding window of w= 10 consecutive
data points. The abscissa represents the geometric mean of the n-values contained in a window.
algorithm can help to derive the observed n−1/4 decay of the probability pn that a random
instance of size n has a solution.
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